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Cities as world-political actors? The “tax haven-
free” cities initiative and the politics of public
procurement
Matti Ylönen1
ABSTRACT In recent years, interest in the world-political role of cities has grown. The use
of public procurement for promoting world-political goals has also gathered scholarly
attention, as has the tax justice policy agenda. This article contributes to these discussions by
demonstrating how global responsibility became part of the city of Helsinki’s policy align-
ments, which were then turned into several concrete initiatives. In particular, I focus on the
contrast between the relative ease with which Helsinki became a “Fair Trade” city on the one
hand and the difﬁculties it faced in its attempts to become a “Fair Tax” city on the other.
I argue that that these initiatives illustrate how cities can utilize public procurement to
promote world-political goals. I also show how the increasing complexity of the required
procurement criteria can make the success contingent on help from “emergent entrepre-
neurs” of social movements. These developments highlight the contradictory and complex
effects of the “economization” and “marketization” of the political sphere. While econo-
mization isolates many societal issues from political control, it can also allow for politicizing
local and global issues in ways that were unthinkable. Finally, adding to the existing research
on the world-political role of cities, I demonstrate that a city does not need to be a metropolis
in order to act in world politics.
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Introduction
This article analyses the dual role of cities in world politicsthrough their procurement activities. Cities can act inworld-political arenas in their own right in addition to
providing a platform for social movements to leverage their
campaign activities. However, I will show how the ease of
harnessing public procurement for these purposes depends on the
level of economization and the complexity of the required
procurement criteria. The more complex the needed criteria is,
the more likely it is that social movements and city-level decision
makers will need help from “emergent entrepreneurs” (Seabrooke
and Wigan, 2015) who can provide them with the required
technical expertise. These are relatively new domains of research.
The academic literature on the world-political role of cities is
scarce, and the role of procurement activities in these processes
has received even less attention. Even though tax policies have
already started to gather attention in world politics for some
years,1 the majority of the scholarly literature on tax justice
campaigns is very recent (for example, Lesage and Kacar, 2013;
Seabrooke and Wigan, 2013; Seabrooke and Wigan, 2015).
One of the few scholars who has written extensively on cities as
political actors, Acuto (2009: 175), has tellingly noted how “it is
possible to count international studies publications concerned
with the city as a site of global inﬂuence on the ﬁngers of a hand”.
I will argue that scholars of political science and world politics
would beneﬁt from a better understanding of the procurement
activities in an era when issues that have traditionally been
considered political have become increasingly economized
(Çalışkan and Callon, 2009). This is highlighted by the fact that
within the European Union (EU), the public procurement
represents nearly one-ﬁfth of the gross domestic product
(European Commission, 2014). Hence, I will argue that both
the rules governing procurement tenders and the way they are
applied impact not only what kind of products and services are
being procured, but also the societal arrangements that govern the
production of these products and services. The effects can be
observed in developing countries and other places far away from
the city’s borders.
I discuss these issues with reference to two international civil
society movements and the City of Helsinki (Finland), which has
aimed to harness its procurement activities in support of these
international developments. Speciﬁcally, I will show how under
certain conditions, the economized political processes can foster
the world-political role of cities and not just limit it, as is usually
assumed. I describe how Helsinki began to recognize its world-
political inﬂuence and the responsibilities it associated with this
power and how it has reﬂected these in its policy alignments and
strategies. On the basis of this work, Helsinki decided to become a
“Fair Trade city” in 2012 and started to use fair-trade-related
criteria in its procurement tenders (City of Helsinki, 2012a). In
addition, Helsinki decided to commission an internal report on
the possibilities of using tax-related criteria in the procurement
tenders. The results were much less encouraging than with the
promotion of fair trade. In the end, Helsinki failed to come up
with a proposal that would have gathered enough political
support and that would have, most importantly, conformed to the
EU’s procurement directive—at least for the time being.
Importantly, the experience of Helsinki reﬂected a similar
outcome in the city of Malmö, Sweden.
I believe that by focusing on the reasons behind the success of
the ﬁrst initiative and the failure of the second, we can gain
several important insights on the world-political role of cities in
increasingly economized frameworks of governance. Conse-
quently, this article makes several contributions to the small
body of existing literature. First, I present a case study of a city
that has recognized its potential world-political inﬂuence and
aims to increase it, despite the fact that it can hardly be described
as a global economic or political hub. This provides a contrast
with the earlier studies that have mostly discussed the world-
political role of cities in the context of large metropolises. Second,
this example helps us to increase our understanding of the
opportunities and limits of using public procurement to promote
world-political goals, which often depend on the level of
abstraction and the complexity of the required procurement
criteria, as well as possible help from the “emergent entrepre-
neurs” of social movements. While key scholars in this ﬁeld have
mentioned the importance of public procurement when discuss-
ing the world-political role of cities, I go further by discussing the
double role of public procurement in both constraining cities and
enabling them to address world-political goals. Third, I analyse
the interconnections between the world-political role of cities and
other world-political actors, especially social movements. I will
argue that the analyses of the world-political role of cities and
social movements alike would beneﬁt from more nuanced studies
of these relationships.
The research material consists of documents issued by the city
of Helsinki, the Tax Haven Free Cities initiative, the Fair Tax
Mark foundation, city of Malmö and other relevant actors. The
material includes strategy papers, board and council resolutions,
and Helsinki’s Global Responsibility strategy. I also conducted a
semi-structured interview of the primus motor of the initiative in
Helsinki, Thomas Wallgren, who is a city council member from
the social democratic party and a lecturer in philosophy with a
long experience in social movements. In addition, I have gathered
information by discussing the initiative with city council
members from competing political parties. Finally, discussions
and presentations in a seminar on public procurement and
taxation organized in Helsinki in April 2015 contributed greatly
to this article.
I begin the article by reviewing and discussing the body of
literature focusing on the role of cities as actors in world politics.
I then continue by introducing the key studies of the use of
procurement to promote social goals. Subsequently, I demon-
strate how Helsinki managed to use public procurement to
promote fair-trade-related goals, but failed to utilize public
procurement for tax-related criteria (again, at least for the time
being). In the ﬁnal discussion section, I demonstrate how lessons
from Helsinki can contribute to the small body of existing
research on the world-political role of cities and the role of public
procurement in promoting political goals.
Review of the earlier literature: sites of action or actors in
their own right?
The role of cities in the global economy has gathered increasing
scholarly attention in recent decades. Spearheaded by the work of
Sassen (for example, Sassen, 1991; Sassen, 2000), several scholars
have studied the role of cities in the global economic system.
Sassen has argued that by including cities in analyses of the global
economy, we can add to “our focus from the power of large
corporations over governments and economies” to “the range of
activities and organisational arrangements necessary for the
implementation and maintenance of a global network of factories,
service operations, and markets”. This conceptual shift helps to
analyse places that are associated with the activities of the global
network (Sassen, 1996: 88).
Building on the Sassen’s concept of the “global city”, a school of
comparative research has emerged, evaluating and ranking cities
according to their importance and efﬁciency in global networks
(Calder and de Freytas, 2009: 80). These studies have typically
focused on cities as sites, hubs and facilitators in the networks of
economic and ﬁnancial globalization. While this approach can
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provide much important information on the workings of the
global political economy, it is less useful in illuminating the
possibility that cities could also be actors in global politics in their
own right, as Calder and de Freytas (2009; see also Walker, 2010:
209) have correctly pointed out. This has resulted in a situation
where cities are seen to have a central role in economic and
ﬁnancial globalization, though they may lack the power to
inﬂuence the economic processes they host and facilitate. While
this holds true in some cases, it can hardly be taken as a universally
applicable fact.
Sassen’s critics have pointed out how cities have become active
in attempts to tackle climate change (Acuto, 2013), as well as
other policy processes that are conventionally understood to
belong to the sphere of world politics. Hence, Calder and
de Freytas point out that while “the comparative assessment of
the social and economic dimensions of global cities” conducted
by Sassen and her followers has been important, “systematic
analysis of their political functions remains underdeveloped”
(Calder and de Freytas, 2009). This article presents one attempt to
develop a more systematic analysis of the political functions of
cities and their interaction with the civil society organizations and
movements. In order to do that, I argue that we should critically
review some common perceptions that have so far been put
forward as answers to this challenge. In an attempt to develop a
more nuanced analytical framework, Calder and de Freytas
(2009) introduce the concept “global political city” as one that
“exhibits the broad characteristics of a global city, as conceptua-
lized by Sassen”, but that also serves as a “micro-setting for global
political transactions”. According to Calder and de Freytas, the
key elements of these global political cities are:
(1) Being a policy hub and exercising disproportionate inﬂuence
on global policy debates;
(2) Having a political-diplomatic community, with dense net-
works of ofﬁcial and non-ofﬁcial actors shaping global
affairs; and
(3) Functioning as a strategic information complex, within which
important political, military and country-risk information of
global importance. (Calder and de Freytas, 2009: 81)
Calder and de Freytas analyse the concept of global political cities
by discussing the historical hubs of Rome, Baghdad, Paris, as well
as current power centres such as Brussels and Washington D.C. On
the basis of these examples, Calder and de Freytas (2009: 94)
conclude that their case study “illustrates how cities can potentially
inﬂuence the overall proﬁle of international affairs”. However, the
problem with this approach is that it does not radically differ from
the earlier analyses on cities as sites of political action. This has also
been highlighted by Acuto, who has criticized Calder and
de Freytas by stating that despite the promises of their title,
“which uses the term ‘actors’ to indicate participation of global
cities in international affairs, the article does little to theorize
agency” (Acuto, 2009: 175). He argues, in my view correctly, that
“global cities are not solely places of, but also agents in global
governance and world politics” (Acuto, 2009: 175). This implies
that “studying the city as an actor means allowing for that actor to
be a participant in the phenomena international scholars tackle on
a daily basis, ranging from security and political economy to the
environment and human rights” (Acuto, 2009: 175).2
This calls for the challenging question of what it means to “act”
in world politics. If one adopts a narrow view of politics, this
would probably mean acting within the established frameworks of
international governance, for example, in international negotia-
tions or bodies. This approach directs attention to formalist and
traditional state-centred conceptions of politics and international
relations. These conceptions have become outdated at least since
the growth in the past decades of private transnational
governance, as well as international non-governmental organiza-
tions and movements. Therefore, we need to focus not on the
form of the actors in the international arena, but rather on these
actors’ substantial impacts on the “struggle over the resources and
arrangements that set the basic terms of our practical and
passionate relations”, as Unger (1987: 145–146) has deﬁned
politics in its broader sense.
Acuto (2009,2013) adheres to a similar view by analysing cities
as actants (places of action) and actors in international arenas.
However, he does this by associating the size of big cities (global
cities) with their potential to inﬂuence global affairs. While it is
most likely that a correlation exists between these two, I believe it
would be unwise to assume (even implicitly) such a correlation. In
an international arena occupied not only by states but also by
NGOs, private actors and informal groups, the political inﬂuence
of a municipality may arise from active work in international
networks even if the city is not a metropolis. This can be
illustrated by a comparison with the state-system, where both
small and large states can inﬂuence international relations, even
though the bigger states are more likely to possess greater
power than the smaller ones. However, the smaller states
generally need to be more creative to exert power over global
affairs, for example, by using skilful diplomacy or developing a
strategic focus on a few key areas in global governance. I argue
that the same logic applies to cities.
Most of the existing studies on the world-political role of cities
have focused on city-level diplomacy and action in climate policy.
For example, authors such as Kousky and Schneider (2003), Selin
and VanDeveer (2007), Andonova et al. (2009), and Bulkeley
and Betsill (2010, 2013) have gone to great lengths in
documenting the role and inﬂuence of cities and city networks
in tackling climate change. However, less attention has been paid
to how cities can use public procurement to promote world-
political goals, or be used by social movements for these purposes.
Next, I will proceed to discuss this issue.
Public procurement, world politics and the economization of
municipal governance
Understood as “the acquisition of appropriate goods and/or
services at the best possible total ownership cost to meet the needs
of the purchaser in terms of quality and quantity, time, and
location” (Acuto, 2013: 130), procurement has become a major
function for municipalities around the world. Moreover, public
ﬁnance literature has identiﬁed procurement activities as one of
the four major governmental functions, the other three being
providing a legal framework for all economic activities,
redistributing income through taxation and spending, and
providing public goods and services to the general population
(Thai, 2001: 9; see also McCrudden, 2004: 257). Despite the
academic- and policy-level interest in connections between public
procurement and corporate responsibility, public procurement
has received little attention from scholars of political economy. As
the authors of the report Linking procurement and political
economy note, “there are no analytical tools available that link
political-economy analysis and procurement” (Frøystad et al.,
2010: iii). The work of Acuto has been one exception to this rule,
as he has noted that the “logic of public-private hybridization”
has “recast the traditional political-economic dependences of
these cities on their global market bases” (Acuto, 2013: 131). This
being said, there is clearly a need for a better understanding of the
relationship between cities, procurement and world politics.
There is a long history of linking public procurement with the
promotion of political goals. Social justice issues became
interlinked with procurement already in nineteenth century in
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the United States, the United Kingdom and France. In 1840, then
President of the United States, Martin Van Buren, issued an
executive order establishing a 10-hour workday for employees
working under certain government contracts. In 1891, the UK
Government passed a resolution to ensure “fair” wages for
companies working for the government. The primary beneﬁci-
aries of these early attempts to include social criteria in
procurement tenders were usually male breadwinners. The ﬁrst
major move to widen the beneﬁciaries was made by the
governments of United Kingdom and the United States after
World War I, when these governments began to use public
procurement to address the needs of people with disabilities
(McCrudden, 2004: 257). In the 1960s, requests for racial non-
discrimination found their way into procurement tenders. Anti-
discriminatory rules were later extended to cover other areas,
most notably gender-related goals (McCrudden, 2004: 260–261).
Essentially, early societal goals included in the public procure-
ment tenders were all related to domestic and workplace concerns,
and most of these demands later became binding legislation. Things
started to change only in the 1960s, when public procurement
became a tool for achieving international goals. The most notable
example of this development was the widespread campaign against
apartheid. This campaign was successful in introducing anti-
apartheid measures in public procurement tenders, while also using
other means such as consumer and investor pressure. Moreover, the
international dimension of procurement also became stronger in
the European community, which began to use procurement to
prohibit discrimination based on sex in third-country production
from the 1970s onward (McCrudden, 2004: 263–264). The work
of the International Labour Ofﬁce also had a role in these
developments (McCrudden, 2004: 265).
Developments in the 1980s and the 1990s further expanded the
international dimension of public procurement. These events can
be seen as the natural evolution of a situation in which the highly
developed states had begun to regulate most of the domestic
issues by binding legislation. The delivery of public services
underwent major structural reforms in various countries as
privatization, outsourcing and deregulation became the buzz-
words of the time. As a result of this, public purchases of goods
and services now correspond to 16 per cent of the GDP in the EU,
although there are great variations between countries (European
Commission, 2014). No similar statistics exist on the public
procurement of municipalities. Nevertheless, it is evident that,
collectively, municipal procurement decisions have a major
impact on both national and international economies. The
growth in the use of public procurement has intensiﬁed the
critiques against the contractual method of outsourcing, as
outsourcing was thought to produce unpleasant social outcomes
locally and in other countries. Consequently, the calls have
intensiﬁed for mechanisms that would address this disparity
(McCrudden, 2004: 264). This mood is reﬂected in demands for
better labour norms, human rights and “green” procurement that
found their way into procurement tenders in 1990s (McCrudden,
2004: 266).
It is helpful to analyse these phenomena in the context of
economization. Callon (1998) has deﬁned economization as “the
processes that constitute the behaviours, organizations, institu-
tions and, more generally, the objects in a particular society which
are tentatively and often controversially qualiﬁed, by scholars
and/or lay people, as ‘economic’ ”. In a somewhat similar fashion,
Commons ([1924] 1957, 8) already described in the 1920s how
value and economy became verbs instead of nouns; as “value
becomes valuing; economy becomes economising”. Since the
1980s, the wave of privatizations, outsourcings, ﬁnancializations
and other means of extending markets into new spheres (Harvey,
2005) have resulted in the increasing economization of politics in
different parts of the world. The growth of public procurement
(Maskin and Tirole, 2008: 1) is obviously one key example of this
phenomenon. These economizing processes are typically thought
to restrict the sphere of politics. While this is true in many cases,
the case studies will show that it is hardly a universal fact.
In principle, the sheer scale of procurement activities should
give municipalities and other public agencies an enormous
amount of power to use market mechanisms to exert political
pressure on states. However, the outsourcing wave has resulted in
the insulation of procurement activities from demands that could
be deemed as “political”. Especially in the EU, all such demands
have to be justiﬁed by proving that they relate to the “invisible
characteristics” of the product that is being procured. This
division line is arbitrary, as the invisible characteristics are, almost
by deﬁnition, ﬁctional (Commons [1924] 1957: 23–24). Indeed,
the power to deﬁne which claims could be conceived as “invisible
characteristics” of a product has become of paramount impor-
tance. Moreover, it should be noted that the level of expertise
required for drafting the procurement rules generally increases
with the complexity and level of abstraction of the criteria.
The “Fair Trade Cities” movement is an illustrative example of
this. Internationally, the fair-trade campaign has been the most
successful international attempt to link public procurement with
world-political goals. Initiated by NGOs and activists, spear-
headed by the international labelling organization known as the
Fairtrade Foundation, and fostered by cities that are often
members of national fair-trade platforms, this campaign is a
symptomatic example of new alliances that can shape the idea of
what it means to act in world politics. The concept of fair trade
has been evolving over the past 40 years, and it has gained broad
support from local, regional and international actors. According
to the Fairtrade Foundation, there are over 1.4 million farmers
and workers in 1,140 producer organizations across the Fairtrade
system. An estimated 7 million people have been said to beneﬁt
from fair-trade sales (Bowes, 2011: viii).
The basic idea behind fair trade is well-known. The
international certiﬁcation system aims to ensure better pay
and longer contracts for workers on small farms. Moreover,
part of the proﬁts should be used for community development
purposes. In the EU, there has been a growing interest in
promoting fair trade since the early 1990s from the EU level to
municipalities (European Parliament, 2012). Cities have been
particularly active promoters of fair trade. At a public meeting
in 2000, the people of the city of Garsland, UK, voted almost
unanimously for Garstang to become the world’s ﬁrst fair trade
town. Soon after this, the Fairtrade International seized upon
the idea of a “Fair Trade town” as a device that could be turned
into a national campaign (Low and Davenport, 2007; Malpass
et al., 2007). At the time of writing, the international network
of “Fair Trade town” is comprised of more than 2,200 members
in 18 different countries. A city has to meet ﬁve goals in order
to become a “Fair Trade town” (Fair Trade towns, 2015):
1. Local council passes a resolution supporting Fair Trade and
agrees to serve Fair Trade products (for example, in meetings,
ofﬁces and canteens).
2. A range of Fair Trade products are available locally (targets
vary from country to country).
3. Schools, workplaces, places of worship and community
organizations support Fair Trade and use Fair Trade products
whenever possible.
4. Media coverage and events raise awareness and understanding
of Fair Trade across the community.
5. A Fair Trade steering group representing different sectors is
formed to co-ordinate action around the goals and develop
them over the years.
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The 1990s saw a steady growth in the use of fair-trade-related
criteria in public procurement tenders. The developments in the
EU were of particular importance. In January 1994, the European
Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution to promote fairness and
solidarity in North–South trade. The EP called for the European
Commission (EC) to develop initiatives that would support fair
trade, with dedicated funding and the inclusion of fair trade in
community development and cooperation policies. In the same
year, the EC published a document on Alternative Trade,
expressing its support for strengthening fair trade both in the
South and the North. Consequently, in 1996 the Economic and
Social Committee of the EU welcomed the development of fair-
trade-labelling initiatives and called on the EC to create a
dedicated budget line in support of fair-trade activities. This
request was reiterated in the report on fair trade adopted by the
EP in 1998. This report also put forward a number of proposals
for further EC actions in support of fair trade (European
Commission, 2012).
After several further calls from the EU parliament and
committees for the ofﬁcial EU-level support of fair trade, in
2009 the EC introduced its ﬁrst communication on fair trade. The
communication associated the promotion of fair trade with “the
sustainable economic and social development of the developing
countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among
them; [with] the smooth and gradual integration of the
developing countries into the world economy; and [with] the
campaign against poverty in the developing countries” (European
Commission, 1999). In other words, already at that time the EC
noted how municipal-level procuring activities were connected to
world-political issues. The report acknowledged that “many
authorities are calling for tenders including sustainable objectives
or ‘fair trade’ in their procurement policies” (European
Commission, 2009: 9).3 Furthermore, the communication stated
that contracting authorities are free to deﬁne sustainability-
related procurement criteria as long as they are “linked to the
subject-matter of the contract and comply with the other relevant
EU public procurement rules, including the basic principles of
equal treatment and transparency” (European Commission, 2009:
9). This was a clear statement of political will in support for
linking public procurement with fair trade. In other words, one of
the biggest players in international relations began to underline
the world-political impacts of municipalities long before scholars
of international relations began to study this topic.
Despite ofﬁcial support from the EC, the legal status of fair-
trade-related procurement criteria has been unclear. In August
2008, a contract notice was published in the Ofﬁcial Journal of the
European Union for the supply and management of automatic
coffee machines from 1 January 2009 onward. Issued by the
province of Noord Holland in the Netherlands, this contract
notice provoked the EC to send a formal complaint to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands on 15 May 2009. According to the
EC letter, the speciﬁcations stipulated that the contract infringed
the EU’s public procurement directive (2004/18) by demanding
that the suppliers of tea and coffee adhere to the MAX
HAVELAAR and EKO labels. The Court ruled that Noord
Holland had violated the procurement directive by demanding
that the service providers had to obtain a particular label for their
products. In addition, the Court noted that “there is no
requirement that an award criterion relates to an intrinsic
characteristic of a product, that is to say something which forms
part of the material substance thereof”. Essentially, this meant
that it was possible to use fair-trade-related procurement criteria
as these criteria were understood to be “invisible” characteristics
of the product, but only when these criteria were listed in the
tender without demanding that the products offered should carry
a particular label (Paragraph 99). This was in line with the
guidelines provided in the EC communication.
Helsinki is an illustrative example of a city that has beneﬁted
from the Court’s judgment in the area of fair trade. Since the
1990s, the international activities of Helsinki have been guided by
international strategies that were succeeded by the Global
Strategy in 2012. Helsinki drafted its ﬁrst international strategy
already in 1994 as a “road map for a national capital that was
recovering from an economic slump and opening up inter-
nationally” (City of Helsinki, 1994). Three consequent strategies
then widened the focus by discussing issues such as EU
membership, multiculturalism and cooperation within the Baltic
region. At the time, little attention was paid to how Helsinki
could inﬂuence the world-political framework where it operates.4
In April 2009, the city board of Helsinki adopted a new general
strategy for its future work in which it stated that the city would
draft a separate strategy for its global responsibility. The mayor
convened a working group in September 2009 that presented a
draft version of the Global Responsibility Strategy in March 2012.
Comments and amendment proposals where then collected from
the city board, other municipal boards and the city agencies, and
the Global Responsibility Strategy was ﬁnally adopted in
September 2012 (City of Helsinki, 2012a: 2).
The global responsibility strategy presented a major step
towards extending the political role of Helsinki beyond its
traditional borders. According to Finnish law, “local authorities
shall strive to promote the welfare of their residents and
sustainable development in their area” (Local and Regional
Government of Finland, 2007: 4). Adopting a creative deﬁnition
of the “area”, Global Strategy stated that “to be able to fulﬁll the
goals speciﬁed in the Local Government Act, the municipalities
must be increasingly aware and cognisant of the global operating
environment of their own operations and, for their own part,
actively strive to inﬂuence the global development” (Local and
Regional Government of Finland, 2007: 4). In other words, the
city made headway in widening its understanding of its own role
in the wider global environment.
The strategy included a long list of issues that the city sees as
part of its global responsibility. Among these were the local efforts
to solve climate change and cross-border environmental protec-
tion issues, environmental and social effects, local efforts for
promoting immigration and diversity, guidelines for international
operations, cross-border measures in connection with the
management of ﬁnances and the ﬁnance market, and measures
related to work life and personnel. In addition, respect for human
rights, equality, and diversity were mentioned (City of Helsinki,
2012a: 3). Finally, the strategy mentioned the global impacts of
the city’s procurement activities. Related to this, in 2013 Helsinki
became a “Fair Trade town” and a member in the Finnish
network of fair-trade cities.5
The merits and perils of public procurement
The fair trade cities network and Helsinki are helpful examples
for illuminating several important and under-studied aspects of
economization. Çalısķan and Callon have noted how markets
require “generating and then reproducing a stark distinction
between the ‘things’ to be valued and the ‘agencies’ capable of
valuing them”. Furthermore, they note that two basic types of
entities result: “entities with paciﬁed agency that can be
transferred as property, and entities that are able to engage in
operations of calculation and judgment” (Çalısķan and Callon,
2010: 5). While this bipolar categorization may work with normal
market transactions, the Fair Trade cities example illuminates the
problems we encounter when this kind of dichotomy is applied to
public procurement. Essentially, the marketization of the public
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sphere has resulted in a situation where the capacity of the public
agencies for calculating and judging has itself been paciﬁed by the
procurement legislation. In the public procurement process,
municipalities have to give up parts of their regulatory power for
companies whose actions they can only inﬂuence periodically
during the renewal of the procurement contracts, and even then
their hands are bound by detailed procurement rules. However,
these very same procurement rules create opportunities to widen
the deﬁnition of “area” the way Helsinki did in its global strategy,
and to demand societal standards abroad in a way that would be
impossible if the municipality produced the same products itself.
In a way, these demands turn the economization process on its
head, at least in a limited area. The signiﬁcance of these
concessions can be debated, but they are nevertheless a real,
existing phenomenon.
The long and arduous process of getting an unquestioned
acceptance of the use of fair-trade-related criteria in procurement
tenders is an illustrative example of the merits and perils of using
procurement to promote societal goals. Drafting procurement
tenders are often difﬁcult, as small inconsistencies in wordings
may result in lengthy and costly delays and litigations. Therefore,
in the economized municipal policies the possession of this kind
of legal-economistic know-how has been elevated to a gatekeeper
role. On the one hand, those municipalities, agencies, or even
individual politicians or civil servants with access to this know-
how may be relatively well-equipped to harness procurement for
promoting world-political goals. On the other hand, without this
kind of knowledge, the only thing that municipal decision makers
can do is, more or less, to adhere to an already established and
tested set of “ethical consumerist” demands. In this way,
organizations such as the Fair Trade Organisation can also
become important gatekeepers. The procurement processes they
have managed to get tested in courts have become the “safe” ones
for municipalities, while even small deviations from these
processes may result in legal battles.
This gatekeeper role can be illustrated by contrasting the fair
trade campaign with a failure that another procurement-related
initiative faced in Helsinki, namely, the campaign for becoming a
“fair tax” city. In its global strategy, the City of Helsinki stated
that “the city cooperates with business life to further social
responsibility”, continuing that “the city ﬁnds it important to
prevent the use of tax havens and, thus, avoids cooperation with
companies linked to tax havens”. These demands were listed
under the section titled “Responsibility in the management of
ﬁnances and prevention of grey economy”, which stated that the
“city is in active cooperation with the tax authorities, other cities,
business life and civic organisations, to be able to prevent grey
economy both nationally and internationally”, and that “reports
on the implementation of the action programme against grey
economy are regularly being compiled for the City Board”.
Moreover, the strategy stated that “city acts responsibly when it
comes to investment activities and getting loan ﬁnancing” (City of
Helsinki, 2012a: 6–7).
However, even proponents of this idea lacked concrete
measures for achieving this goal at the time, especially given
the constraints imposed by the EU’s procurement directive.
Consequently, the city board commissioned a report from the
city’s civil servants on issues related to tax havens, with an aim to
draw from experiences from other EU countries and to map the
ways that municipalities could avoid cooperation with such
companies. The report was concluded in 2013, and it noted the
impossibility of using “voluntary or mandatory criteria for
excluding companies on the grounds that they have connections
with tax havens” (City of Helsinki, 2013: 12). The report then
discussed different quantitative and qualitative criteria that can
and cannot be included in procurement tenders. Regarding this, it
noted that according to procurement legislation, the “purchaser
cannot use criteria that would measure the qualities of companies
engaging in procuring activities”. For this reason, “it is impossible
to utilize criteria that would take into account the company’s
connections to tax havens” (City of Helsinki, 2013: 12). Finally,
the report noted that it would be very difﬁcult to obtain the
relevant country-level ﬁnancial information from the companies
and suggested that the “fair tax” issues are more relevant for
discussions of corporate social responsibility.
After the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2009, several municipalities
became interested in linking procurement with tax-related
objectives. Helsinki and the city of Malmö were particularly
active in taking these initiatives to the city board and council
levels, but similar developments also took place in France and
some other countries. In August 2012, the city council of Malmö
decided to examine the possibility of including transparency-
related criteria in procurement tenders for companies with
linkages to tax haven countries (City of Malmö, 2012).6 However,
in a report published in 2013, the city noted that the City Ofﬁce
had looked into this issue, but there was very little or no
opportunity to promote such transparency demands under the
current legislation (City of Malmö, 2013). In other words,
whereas the Fair Trade campaign had been made possible by the
international network, an international dimension alone could
not help the fair tax initiative to succeed.7
This international dimension included more than informal
exchange of ideas. In March 2014, international cooperation
geared up as the “tax haven-free cities” network was founded
during a conference organized in Stockholm, Sweden. The
network gathered the key people who were pushing these
initiatives in Finland, Sweden and other countries, and worked
as a platform for city-level activists to share information and ideas
and to spread knowledge on these topics. It aims for the
following:
 Cooperation and transparency instead of the secrecy provided
by tax havens, the corporate manipulated accounting and the
tax competition between countries
 A public register of companies’ real owners, including all
shadow structures like trusts, private foundations and shadow
companies
 A global agreement on automatic exchange of information
between tax authorities
 Country-by-country reporting by multinational corporations in
all sectors showing their ﬁnancial activities for each country in
which they operate to make visible their tax strategies
(Taxhavenfreecities.org, 2015)
In addition, the call stated that “local governments in all
countries can cooperate and better utilise the possibilities
available today to be ‘tax haven free,’ i.e. to prevent tax money
from going to companies, banks or other ﬁnancial institutions
that use tax havens for tax evasion”. However, the means for
achieving this were left open, illustrated also by the challenges
that Helsinki and Malmö faced in their attempts to take the idea
really forward. This is highlighted also in a barrister’s opinion
that was commissioned by the UK-based not-for-proﬁt company
Fair Tax Mark Limited. Founded in order to foster voluntary
disclosure of transparent and non-tax-avoiding tax policies in
multinational companies, Fair Tax Mark Ltd. wanted to ﬁnd out
whether it would be possible to use their Fair Tax Mark in public
procurement tenders. According to the barrister’s opinion:
[The] difﬁculty comes with the requirement that the labelling
criteria (i.e. criteria identifying anti-social tax behaviour as an
input to the subject matter of the contract) be objectively
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deﬁned. We recommend therefore that the deﬁnition of anti-
social tax behaviour in this context moves away from the
notoriously hard-to-deﬁne concept of “tax avoidance,” and
focuses instead on objectively identiﬁable input factors that
create tax risk for public exchequers. An example might be the
use of tax havens in supply chains. (Quentin, 2013)
In other words, while it could be possible in principle to
develop tax- or transparency-related criteria for public procure-
ment under current EU legislation, it would be challenging—but
not necessarily impossible—to formulate a set of criteria that
connects tax or transparency practices with the product being
procured.8 Procuring is a technically demanding activity, and
these difﬁculties are further accentuated by the corporate secrecy
applied in many of the procurement contracts, which makes
monitoring the decisions difﬁcult for elected representatives, the
media and other watchdogs. The more dependent the city
becomes on procuring activities, the bigger the threat will be that
it will lose its own expertise and become increasingly dependent
on the outside providers.
After the pessimistic conclusions in the aforementioned report
Helsinki conducted in 2013, the push for introducing tax-related
criteria to public procurement tenders lost some of its steam, at
least for the time being. Many parties and politicians were
sceptical or hostile towards the initiative from the beginning, and
the report conﬁrmed many of their concerns. In other words, the
same directive on public procurement that enabled a relatively
small capital to join the Fair Trade cities network by adopting a
wide deﬁnition of its “area” that went beyond the national
borders also restricted Helsinki from introducing any measures
related to the discrimination against companies based on tax-
related criteria. Using the terminology of Çalışkan and Callon, the
result was an entity with paciﬁed agency when it came to
valuating the ﬁnancial and tax structures of companies, but an
active agency in relation to workers’ rights abroad.
Reﬂections: politics in economized cities
Today, some of the biggest political struggles are fought over
decisions about whether or not particular services should be
outsourced. Politicians are often painfully aware of the fact that
after the procurement decision has been made, their power to
steer the use of public money reduces signiﬁcantly. In this
manner, public procurement “marketises” issues, processes and
structures that have traditionally been associated with the sphere
of politics. Çalısķan and Callon describe marketization as a
particular case of “economization”, which refers to “the processes
through which behaviours, organisations, institutions and, more
generally, objects are constituted as being ‘economic’ ”. Market-
ization, then, refers to the process of economization by
establishing markets. While markets are not identical, they
typically organize the conception, production and circulation of
goods, as well as the voluntary transfer of some sorts of property
rights attached to them’. Moreover, markets “delimit and
construct a space of confrontation and power struggles” (Çalısķan
and Callon, 2010: 3).
In other words, the conventional understanding of the
economization and marketization processes is that they delimit
the sphere of politics. However, the case studies presented in this
article show procurement activities can also create opportunities
to politicize issues that have already been marketized, thus
blurring some of the traditional borderlines between local and
international, or between markets and politics. In world politics,
this also questions the “level of analysis schema” of “man, states and
international system”, which has received too little critical appraisal
(Walker, 1993: 131; but see also Henderson et al., 2002: 456).
While many of the recent accounts of world politics avoid these
sorts of oversimpliﬁed categorizations, the discipline has not paid
sufﬁcient attention to the pervasiveness of world-political matters
in the ﬁelds of public procurement and city-level politics.
The example of Helsinki and the Fair Trade Cities network
illuminates how any city can promote world-political goals to the
extent allowed by the purchasing power of its procurement
activities. The scarce literature on the world-political role of cities
has so far stressed how large metropolises can inﬂuence world-
political affairs. While acknowledging that metropolises can in
many cases be better equipped for this task, this case study has
underlined that factors other than mere size should be taken into
account. As Henderson et al. have noted, “in order to understand
the dynamics of development in a given place, then, we must
comprehend how places are being transformed by ﬂows of
capital, labour, knowledge, power etc. and how, at the same time,
places (or more speciﬁcally their institutional and social fabrics)
are transforming those ﬂows as they locate in place-speciﬁc
domains” (Henderson et al., 2002: 438). Helsinki’s example can
shed light especially on this latter dimension.
While we should be careful not to overestimate the world-
political inﬂuence of any particular city’s procurement activities,
the sheer scale of public procurement activities means that they
can potentially be used for promoting world-political goals.
Moreover, procurement processes and regulations have become
more standardized, especially within the EU, thus creating more
space for international civil society and municipal governance
that promotes more “responsible” and standardized rules for
public procurement. In addition, many of the companies that
participate in procurement tenders operate in many countries,
which make it easier for civil society organizations to target
potentially irresponsible practices. Procurement criteria can also
act as “catalysts” for more far-reaching reforms, as the history of
public procurement has shown.
Therefore, the increase in the number of outsourcings and the
increasing signiﬁcance of public procurement play a double role
in reshaping the political sphere, not only by restricting the
political opportunities but also by expanding them. The former
aspect has been documented extensively in the management
literature. Outsourcings can restrict the political steering
capacities of elected representatives by making the political
alignments dependent on contractual formulations that can be
altered only when the contract period expires (Kuusela and
Ylönen, 2013), and the formulation of tenders requires high-level
technical and juridical expertise rarely possessed by the elected
representatives (Prince, 2012: 198–199). Outsourcings can also
restrict the ability of elected representatives to obtain information
from outsourced activities, as the companies providing the
services typically operate under private law (Siemiatycki, 2010:
389). Continuing reliance on outside providers can also lead to
the deterioration of the municipality’s ability to perform and
assess the substantial matter of the procurements, at the level of
both the administration and the political representatives (Saint-
Martin, 2000). The list of negative aspects of de-politicisation
could be continued. In other words, these impacts restrict and
diminish the political aspects related to public procurement.
The other, more positive role of public procurement lies in
harnessing it to promote world-political goals. Related to this, the
comparison between the Fair Trade and the Fair Tax initiatives
highlights several interesting aspects. The Fair Trade campaign
has been successful in building long-term growth based on raising
public awareness, campaigning on different levels of politics, and
building technical expertise and easily duplicable models that
decision makers can endorse without much technical expertise.
Especially since the endorsement from the European Court of
Justice, obtaining the Fair Trade Mark has become a relatively
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easy goal for both municipal politicians and local-level activists to
promote. However, in contrast with the fair-tax initiative, the
process was steered by civil society networks with longstanding
expertise in this area. Moreover, the idea of using procurement to
promote work-related rights also has a long and well-established
history, even though the fair trade campaign has added a new,
international dimension to it.
The loose campaign for introducing fair-tax-related procure-
ment criteria to procurement tenders provides in many ways a
contrasting example. There were two key reasons for the failure of
the fair-tax initiative beyond those related simply to the political
balance of power in Helsinki (which was also an important factor,
as many key decision makers categorically opposed the initiative).
First, neither the city’s decision makers nor the city ofﬁcials
possessed the know-how required for formulating a procurement
tender that could have functioned as a starting point for political
discussions of the matter. Second, there was a great deal of
uncertainty over whether the possible tax- or transparency-
related procurement demands would be compatible with the EU’s
procurement directive. Both of these reasons highlight the
importance of technical expertise in harnessing public procure-
ment for complex societal goals.
However, this situation might be changing. In December 2015,
the EP gave a resolution titled “Report with recommendations to
the Commission on bringing transparency, coordination and
convergence to Corporate Tax policies in the Union” (European
Parliament, 2015). Referring to the Fair Tax Mark as a precedent,
the Parliament called on the EC to bring forward a proposal “as
soon as possible on a voluntary European ‘Fair Tax Payer’ label”,
including “eligibility criteria, under which the label could be
awarded by national bodies”. Moreover, the Parliament
demanded that the “Fair Tax Payer” label only be “awarded to
those companies that have gone above and beyond the letter of
what is required of them under Union and national law”, and that
“companies should be motivated by this ‘Fair Tax Payer’ label to
make paying a fair share of taxes an essential part of their
corporate social responsibility policy, and to report on their
stance on taxation matters in their annual report”. When the EC
discussed the issue in connection with the development of a wider
country-by-country reporting initiative, it noted its interest “in
further promoting the use of fair tax payer labels as a private
market initiative” (European Commission, 2016).
This progress would most likely not have taken place without
the active role of the Fair Tax Mark initiative that draws on the
expertise of some of the key persons in the Tax Justice Network.
The emergent entrepreneurs (Seabrooke and Wigan, 2015) of the
network were partially the same people who played key roles in
elevating the mandatory country-by-country reporting of multi-
national companies to the policy agenda of the EU (Seabrooke
and Wigan, 2015). This highlights how “ideas are powered
through expertise” (Seabrooke and Wigan, 2015). At the same
time, the big tax advisory ﬁrms are busy developing their own
voluntary tax responsibility measures such as the “Total Tax
Contribution” of the PriceWaterhouseCoopers, thereby mimick-
ing “the vocabulary of transparency whilst providing no
information about its role in tax avoidance, the schemes that it
manufactures, the amount of tax that major corporations should
have paid, or even the fees that the ﬁrm charges for such spin and
whitewash” (Sikka and Willmott, 2013).
Finally, it should be noted that even though the labour issues
embedded in procuring fair trade products are at ﬁrst sight more
straightforward than the fair tax agenda, this difference is largely
illusory. When it comes to the characteristics of a particular
product, the labour rights promoted by the fair trade are
essentially just as “invisible” as demands related to corporate
structures or transparency. This highlights the political role of the
courts of justice in deﬁning what aspects of the capitalist
production process and its discontents are characteristics of the
products and which aspects should be seen as by-products that
can be ignored.
The efforts to link public procurement with tax compliance
and transparency continue both in Finland and internationally. In
2015, some of the key people behind Helsinki’s tax initiative
founded a non-proﬁt organization, which promotes “fair tax” in
public procurement and continues to develop demands that
would comply with the EU’s procurement directive. Internation-
ally, the British Fair Tax Mark has continued to generate interest
towards this thematic, even though it is not directly related to the
public procurement. Moreover, the payment of taxes has become
a growing social responsibility issue, with contestations between
businesses and their adversaries over how to deﬁne the limits of
this responsibility (Ylönen and Laine, 2015).
These kinds of contestations and clashes over private corporate
interests and increasingly economized municipal policy-making
are likely to increase in the future. One can only hope that the
scholars of world politics and global political economy will start
paying more attention to these developments and to develop
more nuanced theoretical framework and case studies that will
help increase our understanding of the linkages between
municipalities, public procurement and the world politics.
Notes
1 For example, Eden and Kudrle, 2005; Sharman, 2006; Eden, 2007; Rixen, 2008; Sagaﬁ-
Nejad et al., 2008; Rixen, 2010; Nölke, 2011; Palan et al., 2013.
2 This is echoed in the thoughts of (Walker, 2010, p. 209), who has noted that “the
prevailing traditions of political theory and theories of international relations still
assume that cities are where and what they are supposed to be, at considerable cost, I
would say, to their claims to scholarly credibility”.
3 “Contributing to Sustainable Development: The role of Fair Trade and non-
governmental trade-related sustainability assurance schemes.”
4 However, Helsinki had shared its lobbying ofﬁce in Brussels with some Finnish
regional associations and universities since 1996, which was brieﬂy noted in the 2008
strategy (City of Helsinki, 2008; City of Helsinki, 2012b).
5 Only four city board members opposed increasing the use of fair trade products and
applying the Fair Trade City status, with 75 board members showing their support
(City of Helsinki, 2012c).
6 The Swedish-language decision stated, “Under överläggningen yrkar kommunstyr-
elsens ordförande att det görs ett tillägg efter första att-satsen med följande lydelse; att
även undersöka möjligheten för att antingen offentlighetsprincipen skall gälla för
skatteﬁnansierad verksamhet i välfärdsektorn eller att kunna ställa krav på ekonomisk
insyn bl.a. för att undvika upphandling av företag kopplade till s.k. skatteparadis”.
7 International municipal-level networking activities have not gone unnoticed by the
civil society organizations campaigning for tax justice issues. Helsinki’s attempts to
connect taxes and public procurement have been addressed, for example, by Richard
Murphy, senior advisor and one of the founding members of the Tax Justice Network,
who praised these efforts in his blog and called for more action in the United Kingdom
(Murphy, 2012). In Scotland, both the UK’s largest public-sector service union,
UNISON, and the Ethical Consumer Association referred to developments in Helsinki
and Malmö in their submissions to the Procurement Reform (Scotland) Bill (UNISON,
2012; Ethical Consumer Research Association, 2013).
8 However, it should be noted that the public procurement directive was renewed in
2014 and is currently being implemented in national legislations. Of importance is the
Article 77, which addresses some public contracts in health, social and cultural ser-
vices. It includes a clause stating that, under certain conditions, companies engaged in
procurement should reinvest their proﬁts “with a view to achieving the organisation’s
objective” and “where proﬁts are distributed or redistributed, this should be based on
participatory considerations” (Paragraph 2b).
References
Acuto M (2009) Global cities as actors: A rejoinder to Calder and de Freytas. SAIS
Review; 29 (2): 175–178.
Acuto M (2013) Global Cities, Governance and Diplomacy: The Urban Link.
Routledge: London.
Andonova L, Michele B, Betsill M and Bulkeley H (2009) Transnational climate
governance. Global Environmental Politics; 9 (2): 52–73.
Bowes J (2011) The Fair Trade Revolution. Pluto: London.
ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.41
8 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 2:16041 |DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.41 |www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms
Bulkeley H and Betsill M (2010) Rethinking sustainable cities: Multilevel
governance and the “Urban” politics of climate change. Environmental Politics;
14 (1): 42–63.
Bulkeley H and Betsill M (2013) Revisiting the urban politics of climate change.
Environmental Politics; 22 (1): 136–154.
Calder KE and de Freytas M (2009) Global political cities as actors in twenty-ﬁrst
century international affairs. SAIS Review; 29 (1): 79–96.
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